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Abstract
This paper explores what we know about the impact of information-based 
initiatives on increased engagement, accountability, or improved decision-
making at the school-level, which could then lead to improved education quality 
and student learning. It summarizes and builds on recent large-scale conceptual 
frameworks and a growing evidence base of impact evaluations, and extracts 
lessons from case study research in Australia, Moldova, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines to provide nuanced insight into processes and mechanisms behind 
reform efforts. It also exploits findings from recent impact valuations after 
categorizing them according to the intensity of interventions and their target 
change agents -- parents, teachers, school principals, and local officials. The 
findings suggest that few initiatives have led to improved service delivery at 
the school level and evidence on enhanced learning outcomes is limited, in part 
because they are rarely tracked. While there is scope for improving such demand-
side interventions, we conclude that systemic change will additionally require 
improved accountability mechanisms and greater use of relevant data and evidence 
internally within bureaucracies. 
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Introduction
There is wide consensus among policymakers and practitioners that despite 
increasing access to education, learning levels of children in school remain low and 
inequalities in enrollment and attainment persist. The International Commission on 
Financing Global Education Opportunity (2016) finds that only half of primary-school 
aged children and little more than a quarter of secondary-school aged children in low- 
and middle-income countries are learning basic literacy and numeracy skills. This echoes 
fi ndings from the latest Uwezo assessment, which reveals that nearly half (46 percent) of 
Kenyan children aged 7-13 years are unable to read and understand a basic sentence – a 
fi nding that has remained largely unchanged for the past fi ve years (Uwezo, 2015).
Significant research has attempted to pinpoint the reasons behind the quality 
defi cit in education. Several studies have found that increasing inputs and spending are 
not strongly correlated with results and large differences in learning outcomes between 
countries are not easily explained by differences in socio-economic status (Woessmann, 
2016; Pritchett, 2015). For instance, the Research on Improving Systems of Education 
(RISE) initiative finds that “students from equivalently poor households in Vietnam 
learn much more than their Peruvian counterparts” (Pritchett, 2015). It is clear that 
providing extra resources alone such as textbooks, learning materials, and infrastructure is 
ineffective to improve learning outcomes without also changing the underlying structural 
elements of education service delivery – pedagogy, teacher quality, learning environments, 
financing, and school management – all of which need to be underpinned by effective 
systems of accountability.
This focus on service delivery has spurred interrelated reforms at the school 
level, including decentralization, school-management committees, vouchers, teacher 
performance pay, school report cards, and transparency boards. The basic idea behind such 
reforms is that key problems in education delivery – corruption, inequity, inefficiency, 
marginalization, and insufficient resources – can be tackled locally at the school-level 
even if political systems disappoint at the national level. Key building blocks behind this 
wide range of reform strategies, and the focus of this report, are the parallel efforts of 
introducing or strengthening measurements for assessing school quality and learning, and 
of using this information to improve service delivery at the local level. The dissemination 
of more and better-quality information is expected to empower parents and communities 
to make better decisions in terms of their children’s schooling, and to put pressure on 
school administrators and public officials to make changes that improve learning and 
learning environments. 
In recent years, such research has focused primarily on two related types of 
information-based initiatives: social accountability, which emphasizes the role of 
information in empowering citizen voice to hold actors accountable from the bottom-up, 
and increasing government transparency, which is more recently embodied in the open 
government and open data movements.1
1 Various names have been given to fields of research in this vein, including Transparency 
and Accountability (T/A), Transparency, Accountability and Participation (TAP), and Voice, 
Empowerment, and Accountability (VEA), among others
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This paper takes a sector-specifi c look at information-based initiatives that operate 
at the intersection of these two strands, focusing on efforts designed to use information 
to enhance accountability and thereby infl uence education delivery and outcomes (Figure 
1). It aims to explore the underlying assumptions behind information-based initiatives, 
understand under what conditions information can lead to improved service-delivery 
(and ultimately improved education quality and student learning), and to clarify the main 
mechanisms by which information generates increased engagement, accountability, or 
improved decision-making at the school-level. This paper summarizes and builds on recent 
large-scale conceptual frameworks and a growing evidence base of impact evaluations; 
extracts lessons from a number of case studies (see Appendix) to provide nuanced insight 
into processes and mechanisms behind reform efforts; and compiles, synthesizes, and 
categorizes recent impact evaluations according to the intensity of interventions and their 
target change agents (parents, teachers, school principals, and local offi cials) rather than 
assessing each tactic (ex: school report cards, open data platforms) separately.
This study aims to add value by reconciling the vast literature on bottom-up efforts 
to improve service delivery, increase citizen engagement, and promote transparency. 
Open data and social accountability tend to be treated separately in the literature due 
to competing intellectual foundations. The paper provides a sector-specific evaluation, 
whereas most analysis takes a high-level approach that spans different types of service 
providers, or is education-specific but addresses multiple types of interventions 
simultaneously.  It focuses primarily on low- and middle-income countries, made possible 
by an infl ux of new research in the area
Framework for Thinking about Information and Accountability
The linkage between service delivery and accountability took root with the 
landmark 2004 World Development Report “Making Services Work for Poor People,” 
which identified service delivery failures as accountability failures. The report called 
for strengthening what it called the “short-route” of accountability – direct relationships 
between users and service providers – to compensate for entrenched failures in the “long-
route” – via politicians and public offi cials (World Bank, 2003). Bruns, Filmer & Patrinos 
(2011) then applied this accountability framework to education. This paper focuses on 
accountability relationships found specifically at the point of delivery – the school – 
and including local government and mid-tier officials (such as at the district, regional, 
or division level) who have a significant role in the implementation of accountability 
mechanisms at the local-level. 
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Social accountability
Recently, increased attention has been paid to the idea that citizens could play 
a stronger role in holding local actors to account for the delivery of social services. 
Variously termed “social,” “citizen-led,” or “demand-side” accountability, these initiatives 
are designed to engage citizens directly through improved transparency and access to 
information (Gaventa & McGee, 2013). Most generally, the assumed link leads from 
“awareness (through transparency and information) to empowerment and articulating 
voice, and ultimately accountability (changing the incentives of providers so that they 
change their behavior and respond to citizen engagement)” (Joshi, 2013). This process is 
distinct from “long-route” political accountability via elected offi cials and so is seen as 
especially relevant for countries where representative government is weak, unresponsive, 
or non-existent (Fox, 2015).
With social accountability initiatives, information shared with citizens is generally 
of two types: on rights, entitlements, and roles in attaining services; and on the quality 
and performance of service providers, either in terms of inputs (for example, teacher 
attendance, textbooks) or outputs (test scores, pass rates). Strategies for disseminating this 
information vary in intensity, from more passive information campaigns to more active 
interventions such as social audits or participatory budgeting: 
• Information campaigns: Efforts to inform citizens about their rights to services, quality 
standards, and performance of service providers, typically by CSOs or media. 
• Citizen Report Cards: Surveys carried out by citizen groups or independent bodies that 
capture consumer satisfaction and performance measures. 
• Community monitoring: Efforts focused on monitoring observable features of 
performance or delivery, such as teacher attendance or textbook delivery
• Social audits: A participatory audit in which community members compare stated 
expenditures or services with actual outputs 
• Scorecards: A hybrid of report cards, community monitoring, and social audits. A 
quantitative survey of citizen satisfaction with public services that includes a facilitated 
meeting between providers and benefi ciaries to discuss results and agree on follow-up 
actions
• Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys: Tracking financial inflows allocated from 
the central level to providers, often done in a collaborative manner between the 
government, CSOs and community members
• Participatory budgeting: A decision-making process through which citizens deliberate 
and negotiate over the distribution of fi nances and resources. 
Open data
More recently, an influx of digital technologies has dramatically expanded the 
information base, lowered dissemination and data management costs, and created more 
Information for Accountability: Transparency and Citizen Engagement for Improved Service Delivery in Education Systems
－ 39 －
efficient information goods. Between 2009 and 2012, for example, over 100 open data 
initiatives were launched by governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
globally, including well-known national initiatives in Ghana and Kenya, and international 
initiatives such as the World Bank’s Open Data portal (Davies & Edwards 2012). Such 
efforts have also been enshrined by multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Open 
Government Platform and Open Data for Development Network. 
These initiatives typically achieve their objective by collecting and presenting new 
or previously hidden information that can support the exercise of accountability, or by 
republishing or repackaging existing information in a way that makes it more usable 
(Avila, Feigenblatt, Heacock & Heller 2010). The underlying assumption behind these 
open data portals and other technology-based transparency initiatives is similar to that of 
social accountability initiatives – that technology will make information more transparent, 
which will increase civic participation, and provide incentives for providers to offer better 
services. 
Mechanisms and change agents
In line with the more traditional theory of change between information, citizen 
action, and accountability, Bruns et al. (2011) identify three primary channels in which 
parents and citizens engage to hold education providers to account:
• Choice: providing parents with hard evidence about learning outcomes at alternative 
schools allows parents and students to go to their preferred schools
• Participation: by publicizing rights, roles and responsibilities and documenting service 
delivery shortfalls, information can be a motivator for action by citizens
• Voice: providing credible information provides content to feed the voice that citizens 
use to pressure governments (Bruns et al., 2011).
Underlying these mechanisms are several assumptions, including that “the exposure 
of poor performance will lead to greater responsiveness; that failures in service delivery 
are due to poor motivation on the part of public officials and not lack of resources or 
capacities; or that the existence of accountability and transparency mechanisms will 
have a deterrent effect on errant officials and make them behave better” (Joshi, 2013). 
Recent research has recognized the limits of such assumptions: transparency alone is 
rarely suffi cient to produce accountability and more needs to be understood about explicit 
pathways that could lead to improved service delivery. 
The following is a refi ned list of precise pathways to improved service delivery that 
may occur at the school level:
By citizens and communities: 
■ Communities can engage as local data collectors or verifiers for monitoring 
purposes, which may reveal service failures (for example, teacher absences) 
or discrepancies (number of textbooks or missing funds) that drive demand for 
improvements or reduced corruption (Westhorp, Walker, Rogers, & Overbeeke, 
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2014; Joshi, 2014)
■ Information on positive school outcomes or stories of improved quality can 
motivate collective action by citizens (Westhorp et al., 2014; Joshi, 2014)
■ Information on comparative indicators (ex: assessments or fi nancing) can trigger 
collective action among communities based on the realization that similar groups 
are receiving dissimilar services (Joshi, 2014)
■ Civil society can use information to build advocacy campaigns to draw attention 
to government behavior, such as corruption or inadequate or unequal school 
resource allocations (UNDP, 2013; Gigler & Bailur, 2014)
■ Parents and students can respond to information about individual student 
performance by investing more time and effort outside of school, or increasing 
direct engagement with teachers and school administrators
■ In contexts where choice among schools exists, comparative school-level 
information can impel parents or students to change schools
By service providers and local offi cials:
■ Teachers, school administrators, or local offi cials can respond to monitoring or 
the collection of information (for example, student performance, attendance), 
either in anticipation of the application of rewards or sanctions or out of fear of a 
loss in status (Ringold, Holla, Koziol, & Srinivasan, 2012; Westhorp et al., 2014)
■ Measurements of teacher quality (for example, classroom observation, student 
test scores) linked with set standards can be associated with improved teacher 
support, training, and collaboration, or precipitate the exit of low-quality 
teachers (Gill, Lerner, & Meosky, 2016) 
■ School-based management organizations can develop an understanding of school 
issues and needs, enabling either increased confi dence or capacity to advocate 
for reforms (Westhorp et al., 2014)
■ Teachers or school administrators can use assessment results as a diagnostic 
feedback mechanism, and respond by introducing or retargeting reforms or as 
a basis for lessons or tutoring sessions (de Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno & Patrinos, 
2015)
■ Teachers and school administrators can identify good practice within their own 
schools or at other schools, and set up mechanisms to propagate and share 
strategies for improvement
■ School administrators can respond to market pressures by improving practices 
and performance, or by adjusting fees (Camargo, Camelo, Firpo, & Ponczek, 
2014) 
■ School administrators and local offi cials can improve the monitoring of teacher 
or school performance or other school quality indicators
■ Local offi cials can respond to pressure from school-level stakeholders to retarget 
and redesign reform policies or make changes to allocations of funding and 
inputs
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Understanding which local actors use what types of information to what end is 
the first step in understanding how to create comprehensive data management and 
dissemination policies that support accountability channels within wider education 
systems. 
Assessing the Evidence
Recent attempts to answer “what works?” have been inconclusive for several 
reasons. First, this is a new field of study, particularly in the case of open data, which 
means that evidence is fragmented, geographically concentrated, and difficult to 
generalize. Second, interpretation of the evidence is difficult given the complexity of 
relationships involved and the variety of potential pathways of change. 
However, even more problematic is that remarkably few studies explicitly state 
the assumed connections between transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement, 
which limits understanding and applicability to other contexts. Heavily cited studies have 
found both failure (Banerjee, Banerji, Dufl o, Glennerster, & Khemani 2010; Lieberman, 
Posner, & Tsai, 2014) as well as success (Reinikka & Svensson, 2011; Pandey, Goyal, & 
Sundararaman, 2011). But without a clear theory of change, it is diffi cult to know why 
initiatives failed. Was it, for example, due to the absence of enabling conditions or to 
the misalignment between the type of information and the audience, or because lack of 
information was simply not the only bottleneck to effective accountability relationships.
Evidence base
We have undertaken an exercise to assess impact evaluations with the aim of 
generating lessons on the component or design parts of information for accountability 
initiatives. We distinguish among a range of intensities of information interventions – 
based on whether information is collected (at its most passive), disseminated, or made 
actionable. We then tie these interventions to their associated change agents – those who 
are presumed to change behaviors in response to the information being collected or shared. 
We fi rst build from a comprehensive theory of change between information and improved 
service delivery at the school-level and then categorize and assess 25 quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations within the education sector, ranging from experimental and quasi-
experimental designs to observational case studies (Figures 2 and 3). Studies that assessed 
different components of interventions within a single country or context were separated 
and analyzed independently, bringing the total count in the analysis to 30 distinct 
intervention “arms.” 
Transparency Accountability
Social
Accountability
Open Data
- - -
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Figure 1. The intersection of social accountability and open data
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
Figure 2. Map of components of information-based interventions in reviewed studies
 
  
Note: Many of the included 25 studies tested impact of multiple types of interventions, targeted 
change agents, and outcomes, so the numbers between nodes will not align perfectly. 
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
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Figure 3. Expanded theory of change: Using education information to improve learning
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Figure 4. Data available on Ministry of Education websites, by country
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
As the value of information provision is the main indicator of interest for this 
exercise, we have included only evaluations that isolate impacts of information from 
other “tied” reforms, such as hard accountability interventions that establish performance 
standards tied to sanctions or rewards, or diagnostic feedback interventions that are tied 
with different levels of training and follow-up actions (ex: pedagogical effects). We have 
also excluded studies without a set aim of improving education service delivery, which 
excludes a subset of interventions that provide information on the value or returns to 
schooling and influences the basic parental choice of whether to send their children to 
school at all. This would be an important area of follow-up for future research. 
Within the 30 intervention arms that were analyzed, we found 60 distinct designs 
of information-based interventions, with nearly equal representation between efforts 
that simply opened information to the public domain and those that attempted to make 
information actionable through training or facilitated communications (Information ‘+’). 
We could identify only a handful of cases in which collection and monitoring efforts were 
assessed separately from hard accountability interventions. We found that these different 
types of interventions targeted change agents relatively evenly, with many interventions 
targeting multiple actors simultaneously. A little over half of the studies made comments 
on impacts on student learning outcomes.
Table 1. Local collection interventions
Study Location Details
Collecting Agents Impact
Parent
or
Student
Teacher
School
Management
or Local
Officials
Intermediate
Variables
Student
Learning
Aker and
Ksoll
(2015)
Niger
Weekly phone calls
checking whether
classes were held
Barr et al.
(2012)
Uganda
Scorecard on school-
inputs implemented
by SMC
Null Null
Duflo et al.
(2012)
India
Students take
pictures to verify
teacher attendance
Null
Cilliers et
al. (2014)
Uganda
Reports from head
teachers verifying
teacher attendance
through SMS
Null Null
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
Information for Accountability: Transparency and Citizen Engagement for Improved Service Delivery in Education Systems
－ 45 －
Key Findings
Data collection interventions
We found four cases in which information was collected but not tied to sanctions 
or rewards. These cases varied in technological penetration, from simple scorecards 
or reports, to mobile monitoring through text messages and cameras verifying teacher 
attendance and class occurrence. Not surprisingly, since the number of cases included is 
small, it is diffi cult to draw conclusive lessons.
Monitoring needs to be tied to sanctions or rewards. These studies do suggest, 
however, that monitoring is most effective in cases where sanctions or rewards are 
implied, if not explicitly stated (Table 1). For instance, a randomized monitoring 
intervention in Niger, looking at the impact of mobile monitoring of an adult education 
program, found more pronounced positive effects on student learning where outside 
options for teachers were lower, suggesting that these teachers increased effort because 
of concern for not being able to find another job or source of income if punished for 
absences. Similarly, Duflo, Hanna, & Ryan (2012) found no independent effect of 
monitoring on teacher attendance or student test scores. However, when tied to fi nancial 
incentives, both teacher attendance and student learning were substantially higher – test 
scores in treatment schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in comparison 
schools and, two and a half years into the program, children from treatment schools were 
10 percentage points more likely to transfer to formal primary schools, which requires 
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passing a competency test.
An evaluation that tested two local monitoring schemes in rural primary schools in 
Uganda where head teachers were required to submit daily reports of teacher attendance 
found greater impacts when the collected information was tied with bonus payments: 
teacher attendance was higher, non-reports of absent teachers were less frequent, and 
reported presence was higher (Cilliers, Kasirye, Leaver, Serneels, & Zeitlin, 2014). While 
attendance was slightly higher in “information only” schools than in control schools, this 
was not statistically signifi cant. 
Dissemination interventions
The share of interventions that simply disseminate information without 
accompanying strategies to make the information actionable range from information 
campaigns with easy-to-read pamphlets delivered directly to parents to comprehensive 
online portals that aim to engage all stakeholders simultaneously.  In addition to assessing 
impact on intermediate variables and student learning, we added an “awareness” variable 
for these cases, since a number of interventions have been implemented too recently to 
glean evidence of longer-term impact. Awareness here acts as a fi rst-order variable, which 
would be necessary, but not suffi cient, for further use of information to impel citizen or 
provider response. 
In the absence of awareness, it can be assumed that these types of interventions 
would not show future improvements in service delivery. For the purposes of our analysis, 
when longer-term interventions presented impacts on either intermediate variables or 
student learning, we assumed that awareness had improved if outcomes were positive (and 
not applicable otherwise), even when the study did not explicitly address whether end 
users were aware of the information. 
Success is context-specific. In line with previous research, we find that these 
“information only” interventions are highly context-dependent and are more likely to 
succeed in cases where lack of information is the only bottleneck for behavior change at 
the school level (Table 2).
A recent evaluation on an information intervention in Argentina (de Hoyos, 
Ganimian, & Holland, 2016) showed that providing diagnostic feedback to teachers on 
student performance on standardized math and Spanish tests led to significant impacts 
on student learning outcomes. The study found that simply providing information 
on outcomes was enough to push schools to a new equilibrium characterized by less 
asymmetry of information and a clear diagnosis of important challenges. This is likely 
because Argentina benefi ts from a comparatively responsive teaching force and, therefore, 
fewer capacity constraints to implementing pedagogical reforms than in other contexts. 
Context is also important at the subnational level. For instance, three separate 
studies evaluate the release of national exam (ENEM) scores in Brazil, displayed online 
but also commonly disseminated through media in the form of ranking tables (Camargo et 
Table 2. Dissemination interventions
Study Location Type ofinformation Format
Agents of Change Impact
Parent
or
Student
Teacher
School
management
or Local
officials
Awareness Intermediatevariables
Student
learning
Camargo
et al.
(2014)
Brazil Outputs Website;newspaper Null Mixed
Cerdan-
Infantes &
Filmer
(2015)
Indonesia Rights andresponsibilities
Pamphlet Null
SMS
de Hoyos
et al.
(2016)
Argentina Outputs Diagnosticreport
Firpo et al.
(2015) Brazil Outputs
Website;
newspaper
Lepine
(2015)
Brazil Outputs Website;newspaper Null
McMurren
et al.
(2016)
Tanzania Outputs Website Null
Mizala &
Urquiola
(2009)
Chile Outputs Newspaper Null
Reinikka
&
Svensson
(2011)
Uganda Rights andresponsibilities Newspaper
Shkabatur
(2012)
Philippine
s Inputs Website Null
Taut et al. 
(2009)
Chile Outputs Pamplet;Report Null
World
Bank
(2011)
Sri Lanka
Inputs;
outputs; rights
and
responsibilities
Report
card Null Null
Young &
Verhulst 
(2016)
Mexico Inputs; outputs Website
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
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al., 2014; Firpo, Ponczek, & Possebom, 2015; Lepine, 2015). Camargo et al. (2014) fi nd 
no effect of the release of ENEM scores on either school composition or observable inputs 
(number of enrolled; proportion of teachers with college degrees; ratio of computers to 
staff, and teachers to students; probability of having computer and science labs). Similarly, 
Lepine (2015) fi nds no impact on enrollment in either private or public schools, and no 
loss of students in poorly performing schools. 
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In contrast, Firpo et al. (2015) fi nds that the release of ENEM scores led to changes 
in private school tuition fees, an increase of one standard deviation in the school average 
test score was associated with a price increase of R$41 in monthly tuition fees, and 
Camargo et al. (2014) fi nds positive effects on private school test scores. These results 
suggest that the private providers in Brazil have the ability and incentives to respond when 
relevant information about school performance is made available. 
Targeting a specific audience helps. These findings from Brazil also suggest that 
information is most likely to lead to successful interventions when it is directed at the 
management level, either exclusively or in tandem with teachers or parents. Lepine’s 
study (2015), which assessed whether parents respond to information by changing 
schools, showed null effects, whereas both Camargo et al. (2014) and Firpo et al. (2015) 
demonstrated positive effects of information on provider response in the context of the 
private school market. 
Similarly, a widely cited study by Reinikka & Svensson (2011) illustrated the 
success of a newspaper campaign in reducing capture of school capitation grants. The 
authors credited the reduced corruption to incentives faced by district officials, who 
believed that the threat of punishment had increased since local politicians had signaled 
the prioritization of education as well as strengthened systems of oversight. The positive 
effect on student achievement was also credited to school administrators allocating more 
funds to nonwage items such as textbooks, school meals, and fl ipcharts. Hubbard (2007) 
warns against overestimating Reinikka & Svensson’s results, however, clarifying that the 
information campaign took place alongside concurrent reforms in Uganda’s education 
system, which likely “strengthened the resolve within the Government for reform and 
also hardened the resolve of the donor community to reduce leakages.” In this case, it is 
likely that the disclosure of information was a necessary, but not suffi cient, condition for 
improvement. 
Conversely, interventions are more likely to fail when information is not targeted 
to a specific audience. All four cases where information was provided with the aim of 
engaging all stakeholders – parents, teachers, and school- and district-level officials – 
failed to demonstrate any awareness of or use by the end users. This is demonstrated 
by the failure of open data platforms in both Tanzania and the Philippines to generate 
awareness or use. This is partly due to the low internet penetration in both countries, but 
also the fact that “both the public and policymakers are looking for the insight contained 
in the data, not the data itself.” Or, to put another way: “Data is frightening for many 
people, so raw data is going to appeal to a vanishing few. Open data needs to be open 
plus curated plus chewed plus digested to appeal to most people, including policymakers” 
(McMurren et al., 2016). 
Moreover, Taut, Cortes, Sebastian, & Preiss (2009) demonstrated that the 
assumptions behind the publication of SIMCE data (the national student achievement 
testing system) in Chile are actually at odds: parents were expected to exercise school 
choice based on school quality information and, at the same time, engage more regularly 
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with teachers and administrators to improve learning; teachers were expected to use 
SIMCE data as a formative, diagnostic tool to improve pedagogical practice in the 
classroom in response to increased parental pressures; and directors and administrators 
would use SIMCE to support school-level actions based on relevant indicators of 
learning. However, Taut et al. (2009) note that the formative feedback purpose and the 
accountability purpose stand in contradiction – at once, parents were expected to “vote 
with their feet” (i.e., choice) and shift from low-performing schools to higher-performing 
schools, but also act as drivers of change and engage with schools more frequently during 
parent meetings where such information is shared (i.e., voice). The authors stated that 
the two expected reactions necessarily demand different communication strategies, for 
example, “comparison tables to inform parental school choice versus in-depth information 
on school performance to empower parents to request school improvement.”
Information interventions need to therefore carefully consider the audience as well 
as the presumed causal pathway to improve service delivery. An interesting strategy is 
used in the case of Mexico’s Mejora Tu Escuela (Improve Your School) project, which 
comprises two parts: a public-facing platform targeted at parents and other citizens with 
information on schools and tools to address shortcomings, and a focus on the public-
policy side that reports on problems with transparency, corruption, teacher payrolls and 
the like (Young & Verhulst, 2016). The two aspects of the project are mutually reinforcing, 
but are specifi cally designed with different audiences in mind.
Information made actionable (‘Information +’)
Overall, it is clear that information interventions are far more likely to succeed 
when they are implemented in combination with direct avenues of promoting action, 
either through facilitated meetings, the design of a school improvement plan, or providing 
training or instruction on how to improve student learning. Of 13 unique interventions, 
nine show positive impacts on either intermediate variables or student learning (or both) 
(Table 3). This suggests that lack of information is only one constraint among many in 
delivering quality education. 
Most interestingly, results varied in a program in Indonesia that provided parents 
with information on entitlements under the school grants program depending on the 
intervention design. When combined with facilitated meetings, the program led to 
increased participation by parents in formal channels for providing feedback to school 
(Cerdan-Infantes & Filmer, 2015). However, in the case where information was provided 
only on pamphlets with no associated meetings, no impact on parental engagement was 
seen. Similarly, when information was provided over SMS, parents only tended to increase 
participation through informal channels rather than in school-committee meetings. 
The audience matters. Previous findings that interventions are more likely to 
lead to success if they are directed at the management level also hold for “information 
+” interventions. Of the six interventions that show no impact on either intermediate 
Table 3. Information Made Actionable (“information +”)
Study Location Type ofinformation Format
How the information
is made actionable
Agents of Change Impact
Parent
or
Student
Teacher
School
management
or Local
officials
Intermediate
variables
Student
learning
Andrabi et
al. (2013)
Pakistan Outputs; Inputs Report
card
Facilitated mee ngs
where parents can
discuss freely
Banerjee et
al. (2010)
India
Rights and 
responsibili es
Pamphlet Facilitated mee ngs Null Null
Rights and 
responsibili es;
Outputs
Pamphlet;
scorecard
Facilitated mee ngs
plus training for
monitoring and 
preparing scorecards
Null Null
Barr et al.
(2012)
Uganda
Rights and 
responsibili es;
Inputs
Scorecard
Facilitated mee ngs to
define objec ves,
roles, and indicators of
school progress
Cerdan-
Infantes &
Filmer
(2015)
Indonesia
Rights and 
responsibili es
Poster Facilitated mee ngs
de Hoyos et
al. (2016)
Argen na Outputs
Diagnos c
report
Support to design and
implement a school
improvement plan
de Hoyos et
al. (2015)
Mexico Outputs
Diagnos c
report
Facilitated discussion
on how to address
performance
weaknesses; school
improvement plan
Galab et al.
(2013)
India
Rights and 
responsibili es
Scorecard
Facilitated mee ngs;
training on effec ve
management; training
on monitoring
Lassibille et
al. (2010)
Madagascar Inputs; outputs
Report
card; 
guidebook
Facilitated mee ngs;
workflow templates
and tools; training on 
mo va ng be er
performance;
instruc onal
guidebooks
Null1
Lieberman et
al. (2014)
Kenya Outputs
Calendar;
poster;
SMS; flyer
Parents given
strategies to improve
learning
Null
Muralidhran &
Sundararaman 
(2010)
India Outputs
Diagnos c
report
Instruc ons on how to
use performance 
reports and
benchmarks
Null Null
Pandey et al. 
(2011)
India
Rights and 
responsibili es
Film;
poster;
calendar;
booklet
Facilitated mee ngs
and clear pathways for
complaints outlined 
Wild and 
Harris (2011)
Malawi Inputs Scorecard
Facilitated mee ngs;
Joint development of
ac on plans
World Bank 
(2011)
Sri Lanka Inputs; outputs
Report
card
Training in 
management
structures and 
par cipa on; joint
prepara on of school
development plan
Null Null
Note: Test scores were slightly higher in treated schools, but not statistically signifi cant.
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
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variables or student learning, five did not attempt to engage school administrators or 
district managers. However, in contrast to dissemination interventions, “information +” 
interventions are not as strongly associated with null impacts when all stakeholders are 
targeted simultaneously. Of four unique interventions that engage parents and students, 
teachers, and administrators, three were successful. It is not clear whether this is due to 
differences in use of non-technological methods of dissemination, such as scorecards and 
pamphlets, as opposed to online formats, or that facilitated meetings and other strategies 
were the key to overcoming coordination problems or facilitating action.  
Parents act on particular types of information. Also, in contrast to dissemination 
interventions, the results related to interventions that particularly target parental 
engagement are more mixed. In these cases, it appears that what matters most is the 
type of information being shared. To be more specifi c, parents do not appear to act upon 
information on school outputs, but seem far more likely to respond to data on inputs or 
information clarifying the roles and responsibilities of parents to schooling. For example, 
an intervention that provided parents information on their oversight roles in schools and 
education services in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka 
led to improved learning outcomes and reduced teacher absenteeism, driven by increased 
participation of parents in school committee meetings (Pandey et al., 2011). 
Conversely, a study by Lieberman et al. (2014) found that providing parents with 
information about their children’s performance on literacy and numeracy tests led to 
no impact on parental behavior or engagement, even when combined with materials 
about how to be more involved in improving their child’s learning. This can be partly 
explained by low expectations of parents regarding school quality. For instance, in the 
case of Mexico, parents are largely satisfied with their children’s education despite the 
fact that the country performs poorly on various global measurements of education quality 
(Young & Verhulst, 2016). This underscores the need to relay information on rights and 
entitlements beyond just performance data, either by setting explicit standards or by 
providing a means to compare quality measures in different contexts, alongside tools and 
strategies to hold providers to account. 
 Implementation Considerations
Given the middling evidence base in support of the assumption that data 
transparency necessarily leads to data use and action, it is essential to consider barriers 
to data use as well conditions that may be necessary for impact. The following section 
explores some general lessons, divided into two elements: enabling conditions and design 
considerations (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Implementation of information-based interventions
Enabling Conditions
Political
•   Incentive to release data and respond to demand
•   Culture of accountability
•   Capacity and decision-making capabilities
Societal •   Strong public demand for information•   Legitimate, independent, capable, and engaged CSOs and media
Technological •   Affordable, available, and accessible technology
Legislative •   Established data policies and regulations
Design Considerations
•   Data quality and availability
•   Digital and societal divides
•   Tension among stakeholders 
Source: Read & Manuelyan Atinc (2017)
Enabling conditions
Recent systematic reviews in both the social accountability and open data fields 
(Westhorp et al., 2014; UNDP, 2013; O’Meally, 2013; van Schalkwyk, Willmers, & 
Schonwetter, 2015; Ubaldi, 2013; Janssen, Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012; Menocal 
& Sharma, 2008; Gurstein, 2011; Joshi, 2014; Verhulst & Young, 2016) have identifi ed 
several contextual factors that appear to matter most for information-based initiatives. 
The social accountability literature emphasizes the importance of political and societal 
environments in shaping the impact of reforms, but as open data initiatives have become 
more prominent in development agendas, enabling conditions have been broadened to 
also include technological and legislative factors. 
(a) Political conditions
Social accountability and open data initiatives are typically classified as demand-
side interventions – i.e., enabling and empowering citizens to hold unresponsive political 
actors and service providers to account in fulfi lling their roles and responsibilities to the 
people. However, the success of such initiatives hinges not only on citizen actors, but also 
on parallel efforts from the supply side to address changing demands and expectations. 
Importantly, the supply-side of the accountability equation includes actors within the 
“middle tier” of the institutional system – for example, local government bureaucrats, 
district officers, school principals – especially in view of increasingly decentralized 
decision-making in the education sector. 
Broadly speaking, this responsiveness is a function of high-level support, the 
strength of existing processes of accountability, and institutional capacity. 
High-level Support: There is increasing agreement that service delivery weaknesses 
that appear on the surface to be capacity limitations actually have more to do with 
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incentive structures (Booth, 2011). In terms of information-based reforms, these 
incentive structures are twofold: governments must be willing to both open up data for 
dissemination and use (or at the very least not stymie efforts by independent collecting 
actors such as CSOs), as well as be willing to engage and respond to increased demands 
for reform. 
Not surprisingly, many government offi cials are hesitant to release data to the public. 
This stems from fear associated with being questioned or sanctioned about the information 
contained in datasets, as well as a concern that truly open data can be edited in such ways 
that harm the integrity of the data, and even manipulated to show government actors in a 
negative light. The latter results in many data sets being released in formats such as PDF 
fi les that make analysis and re-use diffi cult. 
Alongside this mindset of fear, institutional culture is built in such a way that 
ownership of data can be used to exert power and infl uence (Lwanga-Ntale, Mugambe, 
Sabiti, & Nganwa, 2014). Making information more transparent thus threatens traditional 
power relationships, with benefi ts falling to data users rather than data releasers. Also, 
benefi ciaries are widespread, whereas those that stand to lose the most from the release of 
data are more concentrated. This makes the process of making data more transparent quite 
difficult, especially considering the large costs associated with building the necessary 
infrastructure of data systems, including the collection, cleaning, reconciliation, and 
publication of data. This skewed risk-reward calculus demands high-level champions in 
key positions to take on the cause of transparency, as was the case in Australia with the 
perseverance of Prime Minister Julia Gillard in promoting the My School platform despite 
signifi cant opposition from teachers and teacher unions (Gerbase, et al., 2017).
Culture of Accountability: Political will is often a symptom of the larger policy 
culture where systems of accountability have been institutionalized in practice. This 
predisposition of the state to encourage citizen engagement or open up data to scrutiny 
is often linked to the extent of democratization, though some researchers recognize that 
democracy is an imperfect measure of policy culture. For instance, democracies can 
be dominated by technocratic styles of policy making that is insulated from the public, 
which may hamper the success of social accountability or open data reforms (UNDP, 
2013). So, too, autocracies or heavily centralized governments may still promote 
inclusive accountability mechanisms as a means to monitor and manage public offi cials 
at the local level (World Bank, 2016a). This is demonstrated by a recent example from a 
social accountability initiative in China that was able to work collaboratively with local 
government officials to improve conditions for people with HIV, despite a restrained 
legal space that limited the ability of CSOs to conduct advocacy campaigns (Wetterberg, 
Brinkerhoff, & Hertz, 2016). 
Institutional Capacity: In practice, even when they are willing to open and 
disseminate data sets, many governments are struggling to build the capacity needed to 
institute comprehensive data systems. It takes a great deal of sustained effort to collect, 
interpret, translate, and share data, including managing the diffi cult fi rst steps of deciding 
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what and how to measure and how to address privacy concerns. Moreover, by virtue of the 
allocation of decision-making functions in the education system, school administrators and 
local offi cials are often constrained in their ability to effect changes in rules or behavior 
that are needed to respond to demands for reform. For instance, information on school-
level budget allocations is less useful if schools do not have at least some responsibility 
over spending decisions.
(b) Societal conditions
  
Capacity and willingness of the public to engage with data are as important as on 
the supply side – absence of either distorts the accountability ecosystem (Lwanga-Ntale 
et al., 2014). Importantly, strong public demand must exist from all levels of civil society, 
particularly from data users such as citizens, community members, media, and academic 
researchers. In addition, users must have the capacity to access, understand, and act 
based upon available information. These accountability processes and relationships are 
undermined by contexts with high levels inequality, social exclusion, or fragmentation (O’
Meally, 2013). 
Beyond the capacity and demand of individual citizens, the success of information-
based initiatives depends on civil society organizations, research groups or media that 
often mediate the collection and dissemination of information. When the ability of citizens 
to understand, process, and act on information is constrained, these “infomediaries” can 
help translate and communicate information in more easily actionable ways. These groups 
may also help shrink wide inequalities by specifi cally providing information and channels 
for change to the most marginalized. 
(c) Technological conditions
New technologies for transparency and accountability initiatives are wide-ranging 
and generate a lot of excitement – social media platforms, text messages, cloud services, 
mobile apps, and web interfaces. The increasing popularity of open data initiatives has 
placed a heavy burden on both citizens and states as they seek to establish the necessary 
technological infrastructure to radically upgrade data and transparency systems. 
For low- and middle-income countries, however, the latest technologies may not 
be the best platform for data collection and dissemination. Many information-based 
initiatives have found the greatest success with SMS or radio campaigns, or even at the 
most low-tech, with newspapers or simple paper pamphlets and posters (Cerdan-Infantes 
& Filmer, 2015; Pandey, et al., 2011). Also helpful are accounts that interpret the data 
or stories that demonstrate successful action. The key to success is that the platforms for 
collection and dissemination are tailored to the end user. 
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(d) Legislative conditions 
As more data are collected and this information becomes more open, tensions arise 
between demands for transparency and the right to privacy. As such, open data and social 
accountability initiatives are more likely to succeed in states with established data policy 
and regulations, including open data licenses that establish who owns and who is able to 
use and access data, and that clarify complexities found with competing legal frameworks 
for copyright and related rights. 
It is clear, however, that privacy considerations are not yet part of the global 
drive toward open data. A recent report by the Open Rights Groups, a digital privacy 
campaigning organization, found that “the regulation of privacy in the developing world 
is very patchy,” and that the vast penetration of digital technologies leads to a “very high” 
risk of privacy violations (Open Rights Group, 2014). Moreover, open government data 
policies often still belong to existing legal freedom of information frameworks, resulting 
in uncertainty about the legality of data reuse and publication (Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & 
Auer, 2015). 
Design considerations
Even the most enabling contexts do not ensure that transparency and accountability 
initiatives will take hold and create impact. As Joshi (2014) noted, assessing the enabling 
conditions of a particular context – especially deeply rooted societal and political 
structures – is most helpful in identifying whether open data reforms should be considered 
at all. By contrast, design considerations help tease out the local factors that affect how 
information-based initiatives unfold within otherwise broadly similar contexts. 
(a) Data quality and availability
A simple but critical point is that transparent data systems are only as strong as the 
source data. In some cases, making data systems transparent will simply be a matter of 
making existing data available to the public, or adapting existing data sets to be more 
accessible or useful to consumers. For instance, in Australia, most of the data made 
available on the My School website were already being compiled by schools or state 
and territory governments. In addition to these existing data sets, though, the My School 
initiative also devised an Index of Community Socio-Education Advantage (ICSEA), 
which provides schools a score based on socio-educational advantage and enables 
comparisons of similar schools. 
In most countries, however, a necessary fi rst step will be instituting structured and 
timely data collection systems to fi ll large data gaps, either by governments themselves or 
capable and trusted infomediaries that are able to collect missing data or data that can be 
used to contest or validate offi cial information. For instance, when the Mexican Congress 
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passed legislation requiring states to provide the federal government with information 
on school conditions and expenditures, follow-through was weak, with 12 of 32 states 
handing over empty or incomplete databases. In 2013, the Mejora Tu Escuela initiative 
stepped in to provide parents and other stakeholders comprehensive data on schools and 
payroll information to empower officials to root out ghost teachers and other forms of 
corruption (Young & Verhulst, 2016).
There are many barriers to the use of government data, even when collection efforts 
are considerable. Specifi cally: 
• Often, data are kept in formats such as PDFs that are not machine-readable because 
that is the form the data are collected, or governments are hesitant to release data 
that may be manipulated (Sabiti, 2014; Canares, 2014)
• Data that are released are often the low-hanging fruit, such as national budgets, 
that is of little value to consumers and thus have little infl uence over accountability 
relationships (Lwanga-Ntale et al., 2014; Khan & Foti, 2015). A recent Open Data 
Barometer study found that “although more and more countries are making open 
data available, politically sensitive datasets and those that are crucial to supporting 
accountability efforts are among the least likely to be published” (Davies, 2014).
• Data that are available are often not detailed or disaggregated to the sub-national 
level, and thus are less useful to strengthen accountability relationships at the point 
of service delivery (DI, 2014).
• Data are not easily comparable, as every agency has its own formats, standards, and 
data collection processes, making it diffi cult to know which data are valid (Ubaldi, 
2013). This becomes particularly complicated for education systems, as a large 
percentage of education and learning data is collected by non-profi t organizations 
and private companies.
• Data in government repositories are often incomplete, untimely, or inaccurate due to 
capacity, fi nancial, and time constraints (Ringold et al., 2012; Ubaldi, 2013)
• Methodologies employed in data collection and analysis are often not transparent 
and may not be based on rigorous or verifi ed processes (Sabiti, 2014)
• National statistics can be systematically inflated due to skewed incentives, such 
as overstating development progress to satisfy international donors (Sandefur & 
Glassman, 2015).
The misrepresentation of data does not always happen by accident or as a result 
of lack of analytical capacity, but rather due to systematic biases in administrative data 
systems. Even evidence from Kenya, who was one of the fi rst countries on the continent 
to have a comparatively well-functioning open data platform, revealed stark differences 
between enrollment rates as stated by the Ministry of Education (99 percent) and the DHS 
(87 percent) (Sandefur & Glassman, 2015). Of course, donors and other stakeholders 
can play a strong role in ensuring that incentives to misrepresent are mitigated and set 
up mechanisms for validating incoming data, such as in Pakistan, where independent 
monitoring units used various verification processes – school randomization, real-time 
2 It is important to note that data could be potentially contained on websites other than official 
ministry websites, but this was beyond the scope of the exercise.
3 It is not clear what proportion of countries do not collect this information versus countries that 
choose note to share on offi cial ministry websites.
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collection, geo-location, e-signatures, and spot-checks – when collecting data on key 
education indicators. 
To demonstrate these limitations, we undertook an exercise to assess the quality and 
availability of data on Ministry of Education websites (Figure 4).2 We found that, of 133 
low- and middle-income countries assessed, nearly half (61) have no available data, either 
because no ministry website exists or because data were missing or prohibitively diffi cult 
to access. Of the remaining 72 countries, 43 have data only at the national level (non-
disaggregated), leaving only 29 countries with suffi ciently disaggregated school-level data. 
Moreover, of data that are available, the majority are in PDF or non-downloadable format. 
In addition, while student data are the most commonly available type of data available on 
ministry websites, only 16 countries provide information from student assessments.3 So, 
too, information on fi nancing is generally on budgets rather than expenditures, when it is 
available at all.
(b) Inequalities in societal structures
Digital divide: Despite ample excitement about the role of technology in disrupting 
stagnant accountability relationships and bringing citizens to the fore in decision making 
processes, it is clear that everybody does not benefi t equally – or derive what the latest 
World Development Report terms “digital dividends.” This is for two reasons: 60 percent 
of the world’s population remains offl ine, and emerging risks of digital technology may 
outweigh the benefi ts, such as in cases where it amplifi es the voice of elites at the expense 
of the technologically marginalized, resulting in policy capture (World Bank, 2016b). 
Not surprisingly, it is the better educated, more connected, and economically advantaged 
that have benefited the most from the growth in ICTs. As Gurstein (2011) highlights, 
the primary impact of open data may be to further empower and enrich the already 
empowered. 
Even when interventions succeed in reaching the most marginalized, they generate 
additional concerns. Poor communities have the least amount of time and resources to, 
for example, attend school-based management meetings, monitor activities of teachers, 
give feedback through redress mechanisms, or track school budget allocations—a form of 
“time poverty” as illustrated in widely cited research by Mullainathan & Shafi r (2013). In 
addition, such marginalized populations often face the highest social cost to action, such 
as facing repercussions from those in positions of power when exposing corrupt practices.
Voices are not homogenous: “Voice” is often understood as representing a unifi ed 
concept – used as simple shorthand for “voices of the poor.” In reality, however, “the 
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voices of the poor (as well as those of other groups) are far from homogeneous – and 
these many voices may not be necessarily complementary, and may actually compete 
with one another” (Menocal & Sharma, 2008). This harkens back to the digital and data 
divide, where certain groups (often male, well-off, and well-educated) are better able to 
engage and have their voices heard at the expense of the more marginalized. Similarly, 
in much of the literature, citizens, front-line providers, and governments are spoken of 
as homogenous entities with similar development goals. However, actions promoted by 
groups of citizens can be at odds with national priorities, which are set according to both 
practical and political motivations.
(c) Tension among stakeholders 
Many information-based reforms are premised on the notion that localized efforts 
at the school level have the potential to generate positive outcomes even in cases where 
national efforts disappoint. These initiatives often do not take into account, however, 
the locus of decisionmaking and availability of resources. The result is that initiatives 
can be misaligned with existing accountability and management structures, which limits 
effectiveness, sustainability, and scalability.  
Teachers: Due to the political strength of teacher unions, governments may be 
hesitant to implement sanction-based reforms directly targeting teachers even if teacher 
quality may be identifi ed at the local level as a primary weakness in the system. As such, 
local information for accountability initiatives may have little impact in cases where 
decisions about the hiring and retention of teachers and teacher salary are made higher 
up the administrative chain and not at the school level, or where local school committees 
are not equipped or empowered to put “teeth” into renewal decisions or to sanction poor 
performance or frequent absences (Bruns et al., 2011). 
For instance, research from Kenya found that students randomly assigned to contract 
teachers performed better on tests, yet regular teachers put forth less effort despite smaller 
pupil-teacher ratios. This was presumably because regular teachers did not face the same 
possibility that contracts would not be renewed as contract teachers. However, in cases 
where parent committees were trained and empowered, regular teachers were less likely 
to decrease their efforts. In a separate experiment, a well-functioning parent council also 
reduced the level of capture by regular teachers attempting to hire their relatives (Dufl o, 
Dupas, & Kremer, 2012). 
Local governments: At another level, the potential impact of information for 
accountability initiatives on fi nancing decisions depends on schools’ or district offi cials’ 
level of authority in how budgets are spent versus the central government. Autonomy in 
the planning and management of school budgets allows school administrators to identify 
and shift spending to areas of need (for example, infrastructure or performance bonuses) 
and may even allow parents’ input into budget allocation decisions. 
Citizens: Social accountability initiatives are premised on the assumption that 
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citizens are more aware of local matters and shortcomings, and thus better placed to 
recommend or retarget reforms. However, may “act in a way that does not improve 
{service} quality or may even undermine it” (Ringold et al., 2012). For instance, a recent 
review of the Twaweza initiative in Tanzania found that parents revered teachers as utterly 
dedicated and are hesitant to support the use of sanctions or strengthened accountability 
mechanisms against them, even when faced with evidence of an opposite reality, such 
as teachers with high absenteeism, low motivation, and a low skill base (Lipovsek & 
Mkumbo, 2016). 
Moreover, evidence from India suggests that parents were more interested in 
immediate benefits for their own children rather than broader issues of learning or 
education quality. In facilitated meetings, parents were most animated about students’ 
scholarships and a midday meal program (Khemani, 2007). Such cases show that reliance 
on parental concerns alone can hinder the potential for collection action that is required to 
have an impact on larger education systems.
Conclusion
A select number of cases reveal the potential of information for accountability 
initiatives to be a strong tool for improving service delivery at the school level. In some 
circumstances, the process of opening information to the public has reduced corruption; 
improved managerial, parental, and teacher effort; and led to more effi cient targeting of 
reforms and resources at the school level. However, evidence shows that this potential is 
limited, and even under the best of circumstances information has not provoked citizen 
action as expected. It has been diffi cult to replicate the small number of successes in other 
contexts, and it is clear that without a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
of change, as well as enabling conditions for citizen action and supply-side response, 
scaling such successes will remain a challenge. 
Nor is it clear that engaging citizens in holding service providers to account will lead 
to positive and systematic impacts on learning. In fact, opening data to the public has the 
potential to lead to adverse effects such as empowering the already empowered, teaching 
to the test, misrepresenting data, and burdening the marginalized who can ill afford to 
divert time away from generating their livelihood. Also, even when the benefits from 
information for accountability initiatives are signifi cant, there are little data on the costs 
associated with them to assess the cost-effectiveness of different strategies for improving 
education outcomes. 
A more positive, systemwide impact on education and learning (rather than localized 
effects) will likely require that such demand-side interventions are complemented and 
reinforced by internal accountability mechanisms within the bureaucracy that rely on 
evidence-based policymaking and strong feedback loops. There is clearly room to build 
on lessons learned from social accountability interventions to improve their impact—by 
linking information to specifi c paths of action; thoughtfully targeting the appropriate type 
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of data to the relevant actor and location of responsibility; empowering infomediaries; and 
working with the grain of existing accountability mechanisms. But the delivery of quality 
education for all depends just as much on the capacity and willingness of governments 
to assess reform options and trade-offs as they respond to increased citizen engagement. 
They can also, independently of community engagement, leverage timely and robust data 
and information systems to improve service delivery within the larger education system.
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Appendix: Case Study Initiatives
Scoala Mea
A social accountability project launched in Moldova by the Expert-Grup, a local think 
tank, with support from the World Bank’s Global Partnership for Social Accountability 
(GPSA). The overall objective of the fi ve-year initiative, Empowered Citizens Enhancing 
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Accountability of the Education Reform and Quality of Education in Moldova, is to 
empower Moldovan citizens through their inclusion in the monitoring of school-level 
inputs and budget allocations. The initiative provides parents and the general public 
information on key parameters of the school (class-size, student-teacher ratio, number of 
students and teachers, qualifi cations of teaching staff), school budgets and spending, as 
well as the school exam results, including comparisons to regional and country averages.
My School
An online platform in Australia with the objective of enabling the collation and 
publication of data about nearly 10,000 schools across the country, effectively offering 
a report card for each school. The website provides three categories of data: operational 
context, fi nances and resources, and student performance. An important element of My 
School is the Index of Community Socio-Education Advantage (ICSEA), which allows 
comparisons of similar schools based on socio-educational advantage and prevents the 
creation of non-contextual ranking tables. 
Check My School
Check My School (CMS) was established by the Affiliated Network for Social 
Accountability in East Asia and the Pacifi c (ANSA-EAP) with the aim to help improve 
service delivery in public education in the Philippines through the collection and 
dissemination of information on local school conditions online and in schools. Community 
volunteers act as third-party monitors that collect and validate information on school 
characteristics and inputs, fi lling data gaps and calling attention to any discrepancies with 
government-collected data. 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Independent Monitoring Unit and Punjab Programme 
Monitoring and Implementation Unit
Government-led independent data collection and monitoring units in Pakistan that track 
key education indicators and disseminate results through online platforms accessible 
to researchers, journalists, and the general public. Data collection occurs monthly and 
captures information on teacher and student attendance, retention rates, infrastructure, and 
management
